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Politics has always attracted the attention of 
the media, citizens organizations, and the gen-
eral public. Recent years have also witnessed a 
global process of “spectacularization” of poli-
tics, which, among other things, has resulted in a 
dramatic increase in the amount of information 
available about many facets of political life.
Politicians, for example, are public figures, 
and much of what they do is now the object of 
close public scrutiny. Nevertheless, the extent to 
which various aspects of what goes on within 
the political sector are observable from the out-
side, which we refer to as the transparency of 
politics, still varies a great deal across coun-
tries. For example, while in some countries all 
individual votes in the legislature are part of 
the public record (e.g., the United States and 
Sweden), this is not the case in others (e.g., Italy 
and Spain). Also, while many democracies have 
adopted disclosure laws that require political 
parties and politicians to report all the contribu-
tions they receive (e.g., Canada and the United 
Kingdom), such laws are not in place in several 
other countries (e.g., Austria and Finland).
It is therefore interesting to ask whether the 
transparency of politics may be systematically 
related to political outcomes, and whether more 
transparency would lead to better outcomes. In 
particular, in this article, we analyze the rela-
tionship between the transparency of politics 
and the quality of politicians, and focus on the 
recruitment of politicians by political parties.
Parties represent a fundamental institution of 
representative democracy, and are the political-
sector analogues of firms in the market sector. 
By and large, politicians are affiliated with a 
party, and typically start their political careers 
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by working for party organizations (see, e.g., 
Heinrich Best and Maurizio Cotta 2000). Hence, 
the recruiting decisions of parties determine the 
quality of the pool of politicians.
As in Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo 
(2006), we model the situation faced by a politi-
cal party that has to recruit new politicians. 
Potential recruits are heterogeneous with respect 
to their political skills, and may either work for 
the party and become professional politicians or 
find alternative employment in the market sec-
tor. Political skills are valuable in the political 
sector and are observable by the party. In fact, 
people who are interested in becoming politi-
cians typically begin their involvement in poli-
tics by engaging in a variety of unpaid political 
activities that are organized and monitored by 
political parties (e.g., student political organiza-
tions, campaign teams, party internships). These 
activities provide opportunities for a political 
party to observe the quality of individuals it 
may be potentially interested in recruiting.
Political skills are also valuable in the market 
sector. They may be directly productive in cer-
tain occupations, for example, working for lob-
bying firms (see, e.g., Mattozzi and Merlo 2006), 
or indirectly valuable because they are positively 
correlated with other skills that are directly pro-
ductive in other occupations (see, e.g., Mattozzi 
and Merlo 2005). As long as politics is not per-
fectly transparent, however, the political skills 
of individuals are only imperfectly observable 
by potential employers outside of the political 
sector, although the party’s recruiting decisions 
also convey some information about the quality 
of its recruits.
The benefit to the political party of recruit-
ing a new politician, which, for example, may be 
measured by the funds raised by the politician on 
behalf of the party, increases with the political 
skills of the recruit. The objective of the party, 
when making its recruiting decisions, is to gen-
erate rents, given by the difference between the 
funds raised by its recruits and the wages it has 
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to pay them. Hence, each politician has to raise 
at least enough funds to cover his salary, which 
is determined in equilibrium by his outside 
option of working in the perfectly competitive 
market sector, where individuals are paid based 
on their expected political skills. In particular, 
the potential market wage of a party’s recruit is 
equal to a weighted average of the individual’s 
political skills and the average skills of politi-
cians within the party, where the weight mea-
sures the transparency of politics.
We characterize the party’s equilibrium re-
cruiting rule, which determines the endogenous 
quality of the party’s membership, and evaluate 
the effect of transparency on the quality of poli-
ticians. We find that an increase in the transpar-
ency of politics reduces the average quality of 
the politicians a party recruits in equilibrium.
To understand this result, it is useful to analyze 
the effect of a reduction in transparency, start-
ing from the situation where politics is perfectly 
transparent, so that political skills are directly 
observable both within and outside the political 
sector. In this case, the wages of all potential 
recruits (regardless of whether they become 
politicians or work in the market sector) are 
determined solely by their individual political 
skills, and suppose that the market wages of the 
most skilled individuals exceed the amount of 
funds they could raise for the party, so that the 
party would not recruit them as politicians. 
Now consider the situation where politics is 
not perfectly transparent, so that political skills 
are only imperfectly observable from outside 
the political sector. In this case, the party’s 
equilibrium recruiting strategy conveys some 
information to the market sector about the skills 
of the party’s recruits. This information exter-
nality affects the equilibrium wage the party 
has to pay to each of its recruits, which is equal 
to a weighted average between the recruit’s 
political skills and the average skills of all of 
the party’s recruits. This implies that as long 
as the party recruits individuals from a range 
of political skills, it can now afford to recruit 
relatively better politicians, since their market 
wages are lower than in the case where politics 
is perfectly transparent. At the same time, the 
market wages of individuals with relatively low 
political skills are now higher, thus not making 
it worthwhile for the party to recruit individuals 
at the bottom of the distribution of political 
skills, who may now be too expensive compared 
to the relatively low benefits they generate for 
the party. Overall, this results in an increase in 
the average quality of politicians, which is big-
ger the greater the information advantage the 
party has over the market sector (i.e., the less 
transparent politics is).1
I.  Model and Results
We consider a situation where a political party, 
which is defined as a collection of politicians, has 
to recruit new members. Recruitment opportu-
nities arrive randomly, and when an opportunity 
materializes the party has to decide whether to 
pursue it. The party can recruit as many poli-
ticians as it wants (i.e., adding a new member 
does not preclude the possibility of recruiting 
additional members). Hence, each recruiting 
decision can be analyzed independently.
There exists a set of individuals of measure 
one who are potentially interested in becom-
ing politicians. Their alternative is to work 
in the (perfectly competitive) market sector. 
Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to 
their political skills p, which are uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, 1], and are valuable in the politi-
cal sector as well as in the market sector. Each 
individual knows his own skills, which are also 
perfectly observable by the party, but not by the 
market sector.
1 This article borrows heavily from our work on the 
careers of politicians and political recruitment contained 
in Mattozzi and Merlo (2005, 2006), where we develop the 
basic framework and some of the concepts that are used 
here. Our previous work, however, does not address the 
relationship between the transparency of politics and the 
quality of politicians, which is the focus of this article. Our 
work also relates to the literature on the role of parties in 
the selection of electoral candidates and, more generally, on 
the endogenous selection of politicians (see, e.g., the survey 
by Merlo 2006 and the references therein). The focus of this 
literature, however, is quite different form the objective of 
our article. There is a recent related literature that studies 
the effects of transparency in a variety of political institu-
tions, for example, elections, committees, legislatures, and 
bureaucracies (see, e.g., Andrea Prat 2005; Ernesto Dal Bo 
2006; Alessandro Gavazza and Alessandro Lizzeri 2006; 
Gilat Levy 2007, and the other articles included in this ses-
sion). Like the results in our article, this literature finds that 
increasing transparency does not necessarily lead to better 
outcomes.
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If an individual with political skills p [ [0, 1] 
joins the party, he raises an amount of funds for 
the party equal to y 1p 2 5 gpa, where a [ 10,1 2 , 
and g [ (0, 1/2]. Hence, the fund-raising technol-
ogy y 1p 2  is described by a standard production 
function, which is increasing and concave. If the 
party recruits the individual, the party’s payoff 
is equal to y 1p 2 2 wP 1p 2 , where wP 1p 2  is the 
(endogenous) wage the party pays to the indi-
vidual. If, on the other hand, the party does not 
recruit him, the party’s payoff generated by the 
lost recruiting opportunity is equal to zero.
The political skills of individuals are only 
imperfectly observable outside of the political 
sector. Since they are known by the party, how-
ever, potential employers in the market sector 
can use the party’s recruiting strategy to form 
beliefs about the expected skills of the party’s 
recruits. To capture the aspects of the envi-
ronment we are considering, we specify that 
the potential market wage of a party’s recruit 
is equal to his expected political skills (based 
on the information available to the market sec-
tor), and is given by a weighted average of the 
recruit’s own political skills and the average 
skills of a generic party’s recruit. The param-
eter m [ [0, 1], which is the weight associated 
with an individual’s own skills, denotes the 
transparency of politics, where m 5 0 corre-
sponds to a situation where the market sector 
can observe only whether an individual is being 
recruited by the party, but has no additional 
information about potential recruits, and m 5 1 
corresponds to the opposite extreme of com-
plete transparency, where political skills are 
directly observable by the market sector. While 
this specification is clearly a reduced form, it 
can be derived from a more elaborate model of 
the market sector.
We are interested in characterizing the equi-
librium recruiting strategy of the party, and, 
hence, the political skills of individuals who 
enter the political sector. More specifically, let 
P # [0, 1] be a finite union of nondegenerate 
intervals. A party structure P is an equilibrium 
if and only if the following two conditions are 
satisfied for all  p [ P: (a) y 1p 2 2 wP 1p 2 $ 0; 
and (b) wP 1p 2 $ mp 1 11 2 m 2 EM 3P4 , where 
EM 3P4 denotes the expected skills of a generic 
party member from the point of view of the 
market sector, conditional on the party struc-
ture being P. Condition (a) requires that each 
member of the party raise at least enough funds 
for the party to pay for his own wage, and con-
dition (b) implies that no prospective politician 
prefers to work in the market sector.
Suppose the party has the opportunity to 
recruit a generic individual with political skills 
p. Will the party pursue this opportunity? To 
answer this question, recall that the expected 
wage in the market sector of an individual 
with skills p who is recruited by the party is 
equal to mp 1 (1 2 m) EM[P]. It follows that the 
party will recruit the individual if and only if 
y 1p 2 2 wP 1p 2 $ 0, where wP(p) 5 mp 1 (1 2 m) 
EM[P]. Concavity of y 1p 2  implies that it is never 
profitable for the party to recruit individuals with 
skills belonging to disjoint intervals. Therefore, 
the party will be willing to recruit any individ-
ual with political skills belonging to an interval, 
as long as the party’s rents generated by recruit-
ing the individual are nonnegative. Hence, P 5 
[pL, ph] # [0, 1], where pL , ph.
Moreover, if g , 11 1 m 2 /2, the political 
party will never recruit the best possible politi-
cians (i.e., individuals with political skills p 5 1). 
In fact, when ph 5 1, it follows that
 y 11 2 5 g , 1 1 m2 , m # 1
 1 11 2 m 2 1 1 pL2 5 wP 11 2 .
Hence, for g [ (0, 1/2], we have that ph , 1.
We conclude that an equilibrium party struc-
ture P 5 [pL, ph] , [0, 1], where   pL , pH , 1, is 
a solution to the following system of equations:
(1)  gpaL 5 mpL 1 11 2 m 2 3 1ph 1 pL2 /24 ,
 gpah 5 mph 1 11 2 m 2 3 1ph 1 pL2 /24 .
The following proposition provides a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for the existence 
and uniqueness of a solution to the system (1) 
above, which characterizes the equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 1: An equilibrium party struc­
ture P 5 [pL, ph] , [0, 1],  pL , pH , 1, exists 
and is unique if and only if a , m.
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PROOF: 
By solving the first equation of system (1) in 
ph, we get
  pH 1pL 2 5 2gpaL 2 11 1 m 2pL11 2 m 2 ,
where ph(pL) is a strictly concave function such 
that ph(0) 5 0 and ph(pL) . pL if and only if pL 
, p~ K g1/(1 2 a) , 1. By substituting ph(pL) into 
the second equation of system (1), we get
S 1pL 2  K 
  
g 1pH 1pL 2 2a 112m 22gpaL 11 1 m 2 1 2mpL
1 2 m
    5 0.
Note that system (1) always has two coincident 
solutions, namely pL 5 ph 1pL2 5 0 and pL 5 
ph 1pL2 5 p~. Moreover,
 
pLS0
S r 1pL 2 . 0,
and
 lim  S9( pL ) 5 
2 11 2 a 2
1 2 m ( m 2 a) $ 0,
if and only if m $ a. Therefore, when m . a, 
system (1) always admits a solution. In order to 
show that m . a is also a necessary condition for 
existence, first notice that when a 5 m, system 
(1) admits only coincident solutions. Suppose 
now that m , a. By dividing the first equation 
of system (1) by the second equation, we geta pLpHba 5 mpL 1 11 2 m 2 3 1pH 1 pL 2 /2 4mpH 1 11 2 m 2 3 1pH 1 pL 2 /2 4 ,
which can be rewritten as
x2a 5 1 1 m 1 11 2 m 2x1 2 m 1 11 1 m 2x ,
where x ; pH/pL . 1 . Define
G 1x 2 ; x2a 2 1 1 m 1 11 2 m 2x1 2 m 1 11 1 m 2x ,
lim
pL S p~
so that a solution to system (1) corresponds to a 
zero of G 1x 2 . Note that
 
xS1
G 1x 2 5 0,
 G r 1x 2 5 2ax2a21 1 4m11 2 m 1 11 1 m 2x 2 2,
and
  
xS1
G r 1x 2 5 2a 1 m , 0.
Therefore, it cannot be that G r 1x 2 , 0 in all 
equilibria. If, however, we evaluate G r 1x 2  in 
equilibrium, we have that m , a implies that 
G r 1x 2 , 0.
In order to show that the solution of system (1) 
is unique, first note that if there are multiple solu-
tions, the limits of S 1pL 2  computed above imply 
that the number of solutions must be generically 
odd. In particular, if there are three solutions 0 
, p9L , p0L , p-L , p~, then it must be the case 
that S9(p9L ) , 0, S9(p0L ) . 0, and S9(p-L  ) , 0. By 
evaluating S r 1pL 2  in equilibrium and rearranging 
terms, we have that S r 1pL 2 , 0 if and only ifµgpLa21(1 2 a) (1 1 m)
 3 c12 2gpa21L 111a 22 111m 211m  a pLpH 1pL 2 b12ad∂
(1 2 m)
  , 0.
Since the sign of the expression above depends 
only on the term in square brackets, if this term 
is monotone in pL the solution must be unique. 
By taking the derivative with respect to pL of the 
term in square brackets and rearranging, we get
 apH 1pL 2pL ba  4ga 11 2 a 211 2 m2 2p2L
    3 agapa21L 1 1 aa 2 11 1 m 2 b,
where the sign of this expression is equal to the 
sign of the last term. When m . a, we have that
 gapa21L
1 1 a
a
2 11 1 m 2 . m
a
2 1 . 0,
lim
lim
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since, in equilibrium, concavity of y 1p 2  implies 
that  gapa21L . m . gapa21H .
Note that in equilibrium the party recruits 
only mediocre politicians. It does not pursue 
either the very best or the worst political talent 
potentially available. This result also arises in the 
model we study in Mattozzi and Merlo (2006). 
In that model, however, the result is due to an 
equilibrium effect that forces the party to forego 
the opportunity of recruiting the very best poli-
ticians, in spite of the fact that in principle the 
party could afford to recruit individuals of all 
skill levels, including the very best. On the other 
hand, in the environment we consider here, the 
result is a direct consequence of the assumption 
that the party can never afford to recruit indi-
viduals with the highest level of political skills 
(which is the case if g # 1/2). In equilibrium, the 
party is not willing to recruit individuals with 
either very low or very high political skills since 
they do not generate enough rents relative to the 
wages the party has to pay them.
The next proposition establishes the compara-
tive statics property of the unique equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 2: An increase in the transpar­
ency of politics (i.e., an increase in m) reduces 
the average quality of politicians.
PROOF: 
The result follows from applying the Implicit 
Function Theorem to S 1pL 2 5 0. In the unique 
equilibrium,
 
'pL
'm
5 2 1gpaL 2 pL 2 11 2 ga 1pH 1pL 2 2a21 2S r 1pL 2 11 2 m 2 2 ,
and  
'pH
'm
5 2 1gpaL 2 pL 2 1ga 1pL 2a21 2 1 2S r 1pL 2 11 2 m 2 2 .
Hence,
'apH 1 pL2 b
'm
 5
  
1gpaL 2 pL 2 1gapa21L 2 ga 1pH 1pL 2 2a21 2
S r 1pL 2 11 2 m 2 2
  , 0,
since by concavity1gpaL 2 pL 2 1gapa21L 2 gapa21H 2 . 0,
and, from the proof of Proposition 1, S r 1pL 2 , 0.
II.  Conclusion
Our results suggest that enhancing the trans-
parency of politics may not be a desirable thing 
to do. In particular, our analysis has pointed out 
a particular mechanism that may generate a per-
verse relationship between the transparency of 
politics and the quality of politicians. In future 
work, we plan to address empirically the rela-
tionship between the transparency of various 
aspects of political systems and the characteris-
tics of the political class and their performance 
in office.
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